Byzantine Emperor Coronation Oath

Byzantine Emperor Coronation Oath

The imposition of a coronation oath to defend the orthodox faith on new Emperors by the Patriarch of Constantinople is well attested in the Byzantine Empire from the end of the 5th Century onwards. The earliest record of such an oath, is found in De Ceremoniis, written or commissioned by Emperor Constantine VII, who reigned from 913 to 959, contained in a fragment from περὶ πολιτικῆς καταστάσεως (About State Protocol) by Peter the Patrician, the Byzantine Master of Offices under Justinian I, from 539 to 565. Peter is likely pulling from earlier sources. In De Ceremoniis I.92, the extract from Peter describes the coronation ceremony of Anastasius I in 491, following the death of Emperor Zeno. It appears the oath was required to confirm the new emperor’s orthodoxy in the context of doctrinal uncertainty following Chalcedon, with Empress Ariadne setting out that the new Emperor would be required to take an oath publicly in front of the Gospels and Euphemius, Patriarch of Constantinople [490-496]. This was likely the first instance of a such a coronation oath, ad hoc in the instance of Anastasius I, but later becoming a standard part of the coronation cermony. The oath given below is a reconstruction of the oath from two sources [John Cantacuzene, Historia, and Pseudo-Codinus, De Officiis), as it was in the 14th century, but is unlikely to have changed substantially since it’s origin in the late 5th century.

Source: Translated and reconstructed by E Brightman. in Journal of Theological Studies 2 [1901]: 387-88.

I, __________, in Christ [our] God, faithful Emperor and Autocrator of the Romans, with my own hand set forth: I believe in one God . . . [the rest of the Creed follows].

Further I embrace and confess and confirm as well as the apostolic and divine traditions the constitutions and decrees of the seven ecumenical councils and of local synods from time to time convened and, moreover, the privileges and customs of the most holy Great Church of God.

And furthermore I confirm and embrace all things that our most holy fathers here or elsewhere decreed and declared canonically and irreproachably.

And all things which the holy fathers rejected and anathematized, I also reject and anathematize.

And I believe with my whole mind and soul and heart the afore-said Holy Creed.

All these things I promise to keep before the Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church of God.

Kallistos I, Life of Theodosius of Tarnov, 21

Kallistos I, Life of Theodosius of Tarnov, 21

Written by Kallistos I, Patriarch of Constantinople, in the middle of the fourteenth century. Excerpt details Theodosius admonishing some Messalians (Bogomils? or some other dualists) Lazarus, Cyril & Stephen in some council in Tarnov. English translation made from the fifteenth-century Bulgarian version of Vladislav the Grammarian.

Source: Petkov, Kiril. The voices of medieval Bulgaria, seventh-fifteenth century: the records of a bygone culture. Brill, 2008. p. 300.

What demon taught you to trample on the holy icons, the lifegiving cross, and the other holy vessels, and even more daringly and without fear touch the holy misteries as if [these were] simple bread, and pollute the Christian food and drink and when admonished, swear without shame and fear with all kinds of oaths? This is why you are truly foes of the law, criminals against the Gospels, enemies of the faith, seducers, deceivers, oath-breakers, liars, and you swear without shame and take oaths. God said this: “I am telling you not to swear, etc.” But when you are denounced as heretics you are seized by fear; you condemn the Mesalian religion as evil and curse it, seeking to justify yourself with terrifying pledges and believe you are not in sin. Yet, at the slightest sign of respite you return to your blasphemous faith as dogs to their vomit!”

Ludolph of Saxony, Vita Christi, Part 1, Chapter 34

Ludolph of Saxony, Vita Christi, Part 1, Chapter 34

Written 14^th Century.

Source: Ludolph of Saxony, The life of Jesus Christ, Part 1 (Volume 1, Chapters 1-40). Cistercian Studies Series 267. Trans. Milton T. Walsh. Liturgical Press. Collegeville, MN, USA. 2018.

Christ’s Teaching on Oaths

Having taught that we must avoid anger and lust so as not to injure our neighbor, the Lord now forbids the taking of oaths and perjury so that we will not offend God, and he gives the proper interpretation to a precept in the old law forbidding perjury. The Jews were of the opinion that this commandment simply forbade lying under oath, but that an illicit oath must still be honored and that a rash oath, for which there is no need, is nonetheless licit. But the Savior says we should not swear for any reason; this does not include oaths that are required, but all useless oaths.

Justice according to the Pharisees meant not committing perjury. The Lord confirms this by forbidding swearing: this is the justice of those who are to enter into the kingdom of heaven. Just as a person who keeps silent cannot speak falsely, so one who does not swear cannot commit perjury. We read that in the multitude of words there shall not want sin, so in the multitude of swearing there shall not want perjury. The Lord had commanded the Jews to offer him sacrifices according to the law, not because these were pleasing to him, but so that they would not offer them to idols, as had been their custom in the past. Similarly, as a concession to their weakness he allowed them to swear by God, not because this was pleasing to him, but because it was less wicked for them to swear by him than by some creature. Jerome writes, “The Law required his people to swear by God alone; not that this was a good thing, but it was better than their custom of swearing by creatures, thereby offering them the homage due to God. The Gospel does not admit of oaths, because every statement of a faithful Christian should be like sworn testimony.”

According to Chrysostom,

Swearing of any kind is not permitted to us. Why is it necessary to swear, since we are not permitted to lie for any reason? Should not all our words always be so true that they can be trusted as absolutely as if we had sworn an oath? The Lord forbids not only perjury but the taking of an oath so that it cannot be thought that an oath is needed to guarantee the veracity of what we say, and that we might be suspected of lying if we are not speaking under oath. An oath is taken for one reason: to guarantee the truthfulness of what we say. But the Lord does not choose to distinguish between what we say under oath and anything else we say. Just as what we say under oath should be devoid of treachery, so what we speak should be free of falsehood. Both perjury and lying will be punished by divine Judgment. Whoever speaks swears to be truthful, as it is written: A faithful witness will not lie. It is not without reason that the holy Scriptures frequently exhort us not to swear: God is truthful and knows what we say, so every word we speak should be uttered as if under oath.

Seneca writes, “There is no difference between swearing an oath and making an affirmation: you should know that religion and faith are involved whenever the truth is handled.” Augustine points out that people who swear call God to be their witness, but it is laughable to think that they have not sworn because they did not say “by God,” but rather, for God is my witness, behold, before God, I do not lie, or God knows that I do not lie.

Therefore the Lord commanded us not to swear at all, that is, not to swear on every occasion or in every case because this would be a rash oath, but he did not exclude taking an oath when this is required. Here the negative precedes the universally affirmative statement, which is equivalent to its contradiction; if it came after the statement, it would be equivalent to its contrary. He did not say omnino non iurare: this would mean that there is no situation in which an oath should be taken, which is false: there are occasions when we should take an oath and other occasions when we should not. He said non iurare omnino, that is, do not take an oath on every occasion. His meaning is not that there is no occasion for swearing, but that it should be done only when absolutely necessary; needless swearing constitutes a rash oath. Therefore, Augustine says, the Lord did not command us not to swear at all because to do so is unlawful, but to curb those who think that oaths are good in themselves and swear easily, and by force of habit fall into false swearing.

There are three requirements for an oath to be proper. The first pertains to the matter about which the oath is taken, that is, the truth; otherwise, there is nothing suitable to be confirmed. The second pertains to the motivation for swearing, that is, to reach a judgment; if this is not the purpose, there is no need to take an oath. The third pertains to the person swearing, that is, the need for justice or discretion; if this is lacking there is the danger of swearing falsely. Hence the prophet Jeremiah says, And you shall swear: As the Lord lives, in truth, and in judgment, and in justice.

It is not only unlawful to swear rashly by God; it is also wrong to swear by creatures, inasmuch as divine power shines out through them. Hence Christ adds, “neither by heaven, for it is the throne of God, and it is from there above all that his glory shines out; nor by the earth, for it is his footstool, because it is his humblest creation; nor by Jerusalem, for it is the city of the great king, that is of God, the King of Kings, and the place chosen by him as the center of worship.” To underscore this divine element he adds, “Neither shall you swear by your head, because you cannot make one hair white or black, for this is God’s work, not yours.”

What Jesus is saying here is that just as we should not swear by God, so we should not swear by creatures: because any creature is God’s creation, to swear by the creature is to swear by God. We are also forbidden to swear by creatures lest we give divine honors to what is God’s handiwork, and also to avoid committing perjury by taking a false oath by creatures. (Some believe that swearing by created things is tantamount to swearing by nothing, and the oath is not binding.) Sometimes people swear on the cross or on the gospels, that is, by him to whom these objects are dedicated. This also holds true for swearing on the relics of the saints: in this case we are honoring God’s power rather than a saint’s because he is their Maker, and all the good they possess comes from him.

He who forbids us to swear tells us what to do instead: “But let your speech be yes, yes, no, no: simply affirm what is true and deny what is false.” His repetition of yes and no suggests that our mouth expresses externally what is in our heart. We fulfill this gospel precept of yes, yes, no, no when we affirm or deny with both our lips and our heart. Therefore, let what is in our conscience be on our lips, let what is real be in our mouth, and let what is in our mouth also be in our works. Let us prove by our deeds what we affirm in our speech, and not profess by action what we deny in speech.

Christ goes on to say, “That which is over and above these, to swear, is of evil, that is, comes from weakness and suspicion because the person will not be believed unless he swears.” He does not say, “It is evil,” because you do not do evil if you make use of an oath properly—not because it is good in itself, but because it is required to persuade others when proposing something helpful to them. He says, “It is of evil,” that is, it manifests the weakness of another party who compels you to take an oath, when you see that he or she is slow to believe what will be of use to them, and they will not credit it unless you so swear.

There is always an element of evil here, either on the part of person who swears unnecessarily or on the part of the one who demands it. It is either an evil done when an oath is insisted on unnecessarily, or an evil suffered because of a weakness inherent in the human race that we do not take one another at our word without an oath.

Let us speak the truth and commend it by the probity of our conduct rather than a torrent of oaths. And when talking, let us speak plainly and not send other messages by gesture or expression, for such behavior also is of evil. We read in Proverbs, A man that is an apostate, an unprofitable man, walks with a perverse mouth, he winks with the eyes, presses with the foot, speaks with the finger. It is foolish to imitate this unprofitable man and speak with the finger; more foolish still to speak with the hand, because this has five fingers, and it follows that someone who speaks with arms and shoulders is most foolish of all. Moreover, those wild gesticulations and tremors of the head make a person look possessed. It is expedient for us restrain all bodily movements when speaking so as not to give others occasion for scandal.

Bernard Gui, Excerpts from the Inquisitors Manual, on Swearing

Bernard Gui, Excerpts from the Inquisitors Manual, on Swearing

Written early 14^th century.

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On the Beguins, regarding Swearing

Source: Trans.: David Burr. Available @: https://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/source/bernardgui-inq.asp

Teaching or instruction on dealing with the cunning and malice of those who, when required to confess the truth in judicial process, do not wish to do so.

Since, however, many beguins - those who call themselves poor brothers of penitence and of the third order of Saint Francis - want to cover up and conceal their errors with sly cunning, they refuse to swear that they will tell the truth concerning themselves and their accomplices, living or dead, even though such is customary and in fact legally required. Some swear, but want to do so, not simply and absolutely, but under protest, conditionally and with certain expressed reservations, namely that they do not intend to swear or obligate themselves through oath to say anything which will offend God or result in injury or harm to their neighbors. They say, however, that it offends God when the Roman church, its leaders and its inquisitors persecute, damn and condemn the beguins, their sect, since they, as they claim, observe and defend the life of Christ and evangelical poverty. (That is, they observe it as they understand and exposit it, and that understanding is clear from what has been said above.) Again, they say it would offend God if they were to abjure those beliefs which we inquisitors and church leaders judge to be erroneous and to contain heresy, for they say they are not such, but are instead in accordance with evangelical truth. Thus they call good bad and bad good, turning light into darkness and darkness into light.

Again, they say they believe it would cause their neighbors harm and injury if they reveal their accomplices and fellow believers to the inquisitors, for that would lead to their neighbors suffering persecution by the inquisition and sustaining harm. Like a people blinded, they fail to see that it does not offend God when error is revealed and truth discovered, or when one on the crooked path of error is brought back to the straight path of truth and abjures that error. Nor do they see that, rather than harming their neighbors, it benefits them when the erring are led back to the way and light of truth, lest they be further corrupted and lest, by their pestilential contagion, they lead many others astray, like blind leaders dragging them into the ditch.

Thus, in order to oppose their malice and cunning, care should be taken during judicial proceedings that they be forced to swear simply and absolutely, without any conditions or reservations, that they will tell the whole truth and nothing but the truth concerning themselves, their accomplices, believers, benefactors, receivers and defenders, according to the inquisitior's interpretation, without artifice or deceit, whether they are confessing about themselves or others, whether they are responding to questions or offering affirmations or denials, throughout the entire inquiry. Otherwise they will commit perjury and incur its penalty.

And thus one should be cautious lest they take the oath under condition, with reservation, or under protest; and it should be explained to them that it is not an offense against God, nor is God offended as they believe and say, when in judicial process truth is sought while error and heresy is uncovered. And in all this the judgment of the inquisitor, not their false opinion, must determine what is to be done. Again, it should be made plain to them that their neighbors will not be harmed, nor will they suffer any damage or injury as they say, for it redounds to their good and to the salvation of their souls when those who are infected and implicated in error are detected so that they can be corrected and converted from error to the way of truth, lest they become more corrupted themselves and infect or corrupt others with their error.

If, however, they pertinaciously refuse to swear except with the preceding condition and reservation - refuse, that is, when they are ordered by the court to swear precisely that they will tell the whole truth and nothing but the truth - then, once their have been admonished according to canonical procedure, a written sentence of excommunication should be pronounced against the one who, required to swear, has refused, unless that person takes the oath immediately or at least within the time which the presiding judge, through kindness or equity, may have set (even though when ordered to swear precisely and simply he legally be required to comply immediately, without any delay). The sentence of excommunication, once composed, written and promulgated, should be inserted in the process.

If someone incurs a sentence of excommunication and pertinaciously endures it for several days with his heart hardened, then he should be called back into judgment and asked if he considers himself to be excommunicated. If he replies that he does not consider himself excommunicated, nor does he consider himself bound by the sentence, then it will be evident that by that very fact he holds the keys of the church in contempt, and that is one article of error and heresy. Anyone persevering in it is to be considered a heretic. Thus this response should be inserted in the process, and the person should be proceeded against as the law requires. He should be admonished that he should retreat from the aforesaid error and abjure it or else from that moment on he will be judged a heretic, condemned as such, and as such will be handed over to the judgment of a secular court.

It should be noted, however, that to prove his malice, so that his error should appear more clearly and the process against him be justified, another, new sentence of excommunication may be leveled against him in writing, as against one who is contumacious in a matter of faith. He is to be considered such because one who pertinaciously refuses to swear simply and precisely that he will respond concerning those things which pertain to the faith, and who pertinaciously refuses to abjure clear error and heresy, is shown to be practicing evasion no less contumaciously than would be the case if, cited in other circumstances, he stayed away entirely. Once the sentence is leveled against him he should be informed, and the notice should be in writing. If the person, having been excommunicated in a matter of faith, remains so with heart hardened for over a year, then by law he can and should be condemned as a heretic.

Moreover, witnesses - if they are any - can be heard against such an individual. He himself can be constrained in various ways including limitation of food and being held in chains. He can even, on the recommendation of qualified persons, be put to the question in order to get at the truth, as the nature of the business at hand and the condition of the person may require.

The form of the first sentence can be as follows.

Since you, So-and-So of Such-and-Such-a-Place, were arrested or cited as suspect, reported denounced accused of holding the errors and erroneous opinions of the Beguins, who call themselves poor brothers of the third order of Saint Francis - errors which they hold and teach contrary to right faith, the state of the holy Roman and universal church, and apostolic authority - and you have been brought before us, So-and-So the inquisitor, then required and admonished by us several times according to legal form to swear that you will tell the whole truth and nothing but the truth both concerning yourself and concerning your accomplices, believers and benefactors, alive and dead, as it relates to the matter of heresy and especially the errors and erroneous opinions of certain beguins who extoll themselves in opposition to the faith, the Roman church, the apostolic seat and the power of the pope and other leaders of the Roman church, and you refuse to swear simply and absolutely, but will only do so with certain conditions, reservations and under protest - conditions, reservations and protests which are entirely foreign to law and reason - I the aforesaid inquisitor So-and-So order and admonish you once, twice and thrice, according to legal form, under pain of excommunication, to swear before us on the gospel of God in judicial process, simply and absolutely, without condition or reservation contrary to law and reason, to tell the whole truth and nothing but the truth concerning yourself and your accomplices, believers, benefactors and defenders, living or dead. Acting as a witness, tell whatever you know, knew, saw, believe or believed concerning heresy, and especially concerning the errors and erroneous or schismatic opinions held by you and other beguins of the third order of Saint Francis, and concerning anything else pertaining to the matter of heretical depravity. And out of mercy and grace I give you as a first term from this hour until the sixth hour of this same day, and as a second term from the sixth hour until the ninth, and as a third and final term from the ninth hour until vespers, or until completorium of this day. And unless by that final time you swear in the manner indicated, the legally required admonitions having been delivered, by the apostolic authority I bear through the office of inquisition by this same written document I excommunicate you and pass sentence of excommunication upon you, and I offer a copy of it to you should you wish to have it and request it. This sentence was given in such-a-year, on such-a-day, and in such- a-place, with the following people present, etc.

The form of the other sentence of excommunication against one who is contumacious could be as follows:

We, the inquisitor So-and-So, by the apostolic authority we bear by virtue of the office of inquisition concerning heretical depravity, order and admonish once, twice and thrice according to legal form, that you, so-and-so from such-and-such-a-place, swear simply and precisely to tell the whole truth and nothing but the truth about yourself and your accomplices regarding the errors and erroneous opinions of the beguins of the third order, and regarding certain other things touching the faith and relevant to the office of the inquisitor of heretical depravity; again, that you humbly request the benefit of absolution from the sentence of excommunication laid on you by us in writing, which you have incurred which binds you still; and that you return unity with the church, acknowledge your error and abjure all heresy in our presence, so that, having sworn to observe the mandates of the church and our demands, you may deserve to be reconciled with the unity of the church. And we cite you to appear and do all this on the third day from this present one, assigning you the first day as a first term, the second as a second, and the third as the third and last. After that point you will respond concerning the faith and those things of which you are suspected, denounced, accused, telling the whole truth in judicial process about whatever you have done or know others to have done against the faith. Otherwise, if you have failed by completorium of that day to do each and every one of the aforementioned things, all of which you are legally required to do, by the apostolic authority held by us through the office of inquisition, we lay on you the bond of excommunication as one contumacious in matters of faith, because you are evasive and contemptuously refuse to be obedient in these things, and we declare to you that, if you pertinaciously endure this excommunication for a year, we will proceed against you as a heretic. And we offer to you a copy of the excommunication now be placed upon you, should you wish to have it and request it from us. This sentence was given in such-a-year, on such-a- day, and in such-a-place, with the following people present, etc.

Advice concerning the guile and deceit of those who, not wanting to reply clearly and lucidly, do so ambiguously and obscurely.

There are some malicious and crafty people among the beguins who, in order to veil the truth, shield their accomplices and prevent their error and falsity from being discovered, respond so ambiguously, obscurely, generally and confusingly to questions that the clear truth cannot be gathered from their replies. Thus, asked what they believe about some statement or statements proposed to them, they reply, "I believe about this what the holy church of God believes," and they do not wish to speak more explicitly or respond in any other way. In this case, to exclude the ruse they use (or rather abuse) in referring in this way to the church of God, they should diligently, subtly and perspicaciously be asked what they mean by "the church of God," whether they mean the church of God as they understand it; for, as is clear from the errors presented above, they use the phrase "church of God" misleadingly. For they say they themselves and their accomplices are the church of God or are of the church of God. But those who believe differently than they and persecute them they do not consider to be the church of God or part of it.

In such matters industry and skill is necessary on the inquisitor's part. Moreover, such people should be forced or compelled to respond clearly and explicitly concerning what has heretofore been said generally, equivocally or confusingly, through sentence of excommunication, as is described in the preceding section.

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Inquisitorial technique Regarding Swearing

Source: Trans.: H. C. Lea. Available @: https://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/source/heresy2.asp

I. Will you then swear that you have never learned anything contrary to the faith which we hold to be true?

A. (Growing pale) If I ought to swear, I will willingly swear.

I. I don't ask whether you ought, but whether you will swear.

A. If you order me to swear, I will swear.

I. I don't force you to swear, because as you believe oaths to be unlawful, you will transfer the sin to me who forced you; but if you will swear, I will hear it.

A. Why should I swear if you do not order me to?

I. So that you may remove the suspicion of being a heretic.

A. Sir, I do not know how unless you teach me.

I. If I had to swear, I would raise my hand and spread my fingers and say, "So help me God, I have never learned heresy or believed what is contrary to the true faith."

Then trembling as if he cannot repeat the form, he will stumble along as though speaking for himself or for another, so that there is not an absolute form of oath and yet he may be thought to have sworn. If the words are there, they are so turned around that he does not swear and yet appears to have sworn. Or he converts the oath into a form of prayer, as "God help me that I am not a heretic or the like"; and when asked whether he had sworn, he will say: "Did you not hear me swear?" [And when further hard pressed he will appeal, saying] "Sir, if I have done amiss in aught, I will willingly bear the penance, only help me to avoid the infamy of which I am accused though malice and without fault of mine." But a vigorous inquisitor must not allow himself to be worked upon in this way, but proceed firmly till he make these people confess their error, or at least publicly abjure heresy, so that if they are subsequently found to have sworn falsely, he can without further hearing, abandon them to the secular arm".

Nicholas of Lyra, Postillae in Matthew, 5:33-37

Nicholas of Lyra, Postillae in Matthew, 5:33-37

Written early 14^th Century.

Literal Postil on Matthew, 5:33-37

Source: Biblia Sacra cum Glossa Ordinaria, Vol. 5, Ed. Keerbergium. Antwerp, 1617, p. 113-115.

Iterum. Hic dat intellectum cuiusdam præcepti primæ tabulæ, quo prohibetur periurium. Circa autem hoc errabant Iudæi credentes, quod solum iuramentum mendax esset prohibitum, & quod iuramentum, illicitum esset seruandum, sicut Act. [23.e]: dicitur, quod quidam Iudæi iurauerent inter se intersicere Paulum antequam comederent vel biberent, & credebant se tenari ad impletionem iuramenti, vnde Iudicum [II.a]. Iepte ex premissione domino facta immolauit filiam suam, vbi dicunt communiter doctors, quod non placuit Deo. Ex quo patet, quod iuramentum vel votum de illicito factum, non est obligatorium, Similiter iuramentum incautem quod sit sine necessitate; credebant esse licetum, immo etiam per sebonum, propter hoc quod scribitur Deut. [6.c.] Dominum Deum tuum timebis. Sequiter: Et per nomen illius iurabis sed hoc patet esse falsum, quia nomen tantæ sanctitatis accipere sine causa importat irreuerentiam diuina nominis. Quod atuem dicitur Deut. [6.b.] Per nomen illius iurabis: non est dictum propter hoc quod consuetudo iurandi sit licita sine necessitate, vt ipsi dicebant: sed ad excludendam iurationem per idola, vt ibidem dicitur, quæ in nullo casu est licita. q.d. si occurrat necessitas iurandi, tunc iurabis per nomen Dei, & non per nomen idoli, propter quod dicit saluator.

Ego autem. &c.i. ex. quacunque causa: quia hæc est incauta iuratio. Per hoc tamen non includitur iuratio in necessitate: quia negation ibi præponitur signo vniuersali affirmatiuo, quod æquipollet suo contradictorio, postposita autem æsuo contrario vnde, Non omnis, valet quidam non omnis non, valet nullus. Hic autem non dicitur, omnino non iurare, quia esst sensus, quod in nullo casu esset iurandum, quod est falsum, quia quillibet tenetur superiori requireenti per iuramentum dicere veritatem, aliter periret veritas iustitiæ in multis. Sed dicitur hic.

Non iurare omnino. Et ideo non est sensus quod in nullo casu esset iurandum, sed quandocunque deest necessitas. Non ergo excluditur omni iuramentum, vt visum est, sed excluditur iuramentum incautum. Et quia non solum in caute iurare per nomen domini est illicitum, sed etiam iurare per creaturas eodem modo est illicitum, inquantum in eis relucet virtus diuina. Ideo subdit.

Neque per cælum.i. principaliter ibi relucet Gloria Dei.

Neque per terram.i. infima creatura, sicut scabellum est inferior pars sedis.

Neque per Ierosolymam.i. ipsius Dei tui est regnum, ad cuius cultum erat deputata ciuitas Ierosolyma.

Neque. quia.scilicet est opus diuinum, non tuum. Quod probat dicens.

Quia non. vult dicere in omnibus istis, quod sicut per deum non est iurandum incaute, & sine necessitate, ita nec per creaturas, quia cum quælibet creaturæ sit opus diuinem qui iurat per creaturam, iurat per Deum. Sequiter.

Sit autem. Simpliciter affirmando veritatem, & negando falsitatem, & patet quod loquiter in coi modo loquendi inter homines, Per hoc quod dicit: Sermo,&c. Secus autem est in casu requiritur veritas a superiori per iuramentum. Quod autem subditur.

Quod au. Quia est ibi malum culpæ, velex parte iurantis, quando iurat sine necessitate, vt dictum est. Si autem iuret in necessitate requi situs, tunc semper est ibi malum poenae a parte requirentis, quia ex infirmitate humana quae est quaedam poena generi humano inflicta, procedis quod homines non credunt sibi mutuo simplici verbo absque iuramento. Similiter ex parte requirentis aliquando est ibi malum culpae quando scilicet requirit iuramentum sine necessitate.

Moral Postil on Matthew 5:33-37

Source: Biblia Sacra cum Glossa Ordinaria, Vol. 5, Ed. Keerbergium. Antwerp, 1617, p. 113-114.

Reddes autem. Iuramento vero debite facto concurrentibus comitibus quae sunt iustitia, veritas & iudicium, fit Deo reuerentia. Hebr.[6.c.] Homines per maiorem Jui iurant. Et ideo aliqui dixerunt quod iuramentum per Deum erit frequentandum, quod est falsum, quia ex tali frequentatione acquitutur habitus, quo de facili fit iuramentum illicitum. Ideo subditur.

Ego autem dico, &c. id est ex omni causa vel modo, sed solum concurrentibus tribus praemillis.

Duns Scotus, Ordinatio III, d. 39

Duns Scotus, Ordinatio III, d. 39

Work completed between 1302 CE - 1308 CE.

Source: "The Ethics of John Duns Scotus: Additional Translations." Trans: Thomas Williams. Available online at: http://ethicascoti.com/Ord%203%2039.pdf 

“Is all perjury a mortal sin?”

Concerning the thirty-ninth distinction [Peter Lombard, Sentences III.39] I ask whether all perjury is a mortal sin.

Arguments for the negative: Sometimes someone makes an oath that it would be illicit to carry out: Case 22, question 4, “In malis.” And what is illicit in and of itself does not become licit through an oath, so it remains illicit after the oath. And thus by carrying out what he swore, he sins mortally; therefore, he does not sin mortally by refraining from carrying it out. For in the Christian law no one is in a state of perplexity, such that he sins mortally whether he does a certain thing or refrains from doing it (which is what it means to be in a state of perplexity). And yet by refraining from carrying out what he swore, he commits perjury; therefore, this instance of perjury is not a mortal sin.

Moreover, it is more serious to swear by God than by the Gospel—Case 22, question 1, “Si aliqua causa fuerit”—as it is more serious to swear by the author than by his work, just as it is more serious to swear by the temple than by its gold (for “the temple that sanctifies the gold” [Matthew 23:17] is greater than the gold that is sanctified by the temple), and this in terms of sacredness. Therefore, if it is a mortal sin to commit perjury, to commit perjury against God is the greatest mortal sin; so it follows that ordinary people are sinning mortally all day long, since they think nothing of swearing by God even when asserting something false or something doubtful. That seems harsh.

Moreover, not every promissory oath necessarily obligates, according to Case 22, question 4, throughout: “It is better not to make good on a foolish promise than to commit a crime.” Therefore, perjury in such a case is not a mortal sin.

Proof of the antecedent: Look up the discussion of coerced oaths, Extra, “On swearing oaths.”

In the case of reluctant oaths as well it is clear that the oath-taker does not intend to obligate himself. Now no one obligates himself unless he intends to obligate himself, according to Extra, “On swearing oaths,” Petitio, the gloss of Innocent IV, where it is said that “if someone swears five times not to stand against someone else, he can stand against him the sixth time, notwithstanding his oath to the contrary, in the cause of the Church and the commonwealth.”

As for reckless oaths, there is this argument: if the oath-taker were to carry it out, that would lead to a worse outcome (22, question 4, Si quis); therefore, it would be a greater evil to carry it out.

There is a further argument for this conclusion in the case of these two kinds of oath—reluctant and coerced—that relies on the analogous case of marriage. For coerced or reluctant (that is, feigned) consent does not obligate someone to marriage: Extra, “Concerning things done by force or out of fear,” Si abbas, and Extra, “Concerning betrothals,” Cum locum.

On the contrary: Exodus 20: “You shall not commit perjury; rather, give to the Lord your God what you have sworn.” And from the Psalms [75:12]: “Vow, and make good your vow.”

I. Reply to the question

In this question we must examine the definition of oath; second, on that basis, we will conclude that perjury is a mortal sin; and third, we will look at the different kinds of oaths and determine in what way particular kinds of oaths are sins.

A. The definition of oath

On the first topic, I say that an oath is an assertion that a particular human utterance is true, an assertion of the utmost authority, in keeping with the words of Hebrews 12: “An oath is final in every dispute.” For human beings, knowing that they are mendacious and ignorant and consequently can deceive and be deceived, cannot place unqualified trust in what human beings say. And for that reason they developed a mode of assertion in which they bring in an additional witness, one who is truthful and knowledgeable, who can neither deceive nor be deceived. And this is accomplished by swearing: for in swearing I bring in God, who knows the truth and cannot lie, as a witness to what I assert.

B. Perjury is a mortal sin

1. Answer

From this the point at issue concerning perjury follows, since to bring God in as a witness to something false is to do irreverence to God: either by bringing in God as a witness who does not know the truth and thus is not omniscient, or by bringing him in as one who is willing to testify to what is false and thus is not altogether truthful. In either way irreverence is done immediately to God, contrary to the commandment of the first table, “You shall not take the name of your God in vain” [Exodus 20:7]. And so in either way, if it is done deliberately, there is mortal sin.

2. Two points of contention

But here there are two points of contention. First, does a lack of deliberation excuse one from mortal sin? Second, does someone who brings God in as a witness, in the way described above, to something that he believes is true, though in fact it is not, or to something about which he has only an opinion (though he assents to that opinion more than he does to the opposite), sin mortally?

a. The first point of contention

As to the first of these, it is generally conceded that a single indeliberate act of perjury is not a mortal sin.

But committing perjury habitually is a mortal sin. And this can evidently be proven from the fact that a habit generated from several acts inclines to a more serious act than the previous acts were.

But against this: if the first act of perjury is not a mortal sin, then neither is any other such act, even if it is done from some habit, since the inclining habit cannot make an act more serious. Suppose someone were to acquire a weighty habit from acts of incontinence and then swiftly repented. If after his repentance he had some movement of incontinence, though his weighty habit inclines him to that, it is nonetheless not a mortal sin in him; indeed, it is not morally more serious than it would be in someone else who had no such habit.

This is confirmed by the fact that the habit cannot be more serious [than the acts to which it inclines]. Even assuming that a habit can be serious [in its own right], given that it cannot be seriously blameworthy, properly speaking, except through its acts, it follows that since the acts from which the habit is generated are venial, the habit does not add any seriousness to the acts elicited from it so as to make those acts mortal sins.

So it can evidently be said that a habit or custom has nothing to do with the question at issue. Rather, perjury—when there is full consent—is contrary to a commandment of the first table; consequently, it averts one immediately from the ultimate end, and thus there is nothing in the definition of mortal sin that it lacks.

But what if the perjury, however often it is committed, is done without deliberation? In order for an act to be meritorious, it must be fully human, and thus done from full deliberation; and exactly the same thing is required for an act to be demeritorious (for God is not readier to punish than to forgive). So it can be said that that indeliberate perjury, even if it is repeated again and again, is not a mortal sin.

Still, as I said earlier in the material on the virtues [d. 33 n. 77], the virtuous person’s deliberation is brief (so brief that he does not even appear to deliberate), because he has great prudence, which enables him to deliberate in a practically imperceptible amount of time. In the same way, someone could, on the basis of a habit opposed to prudence, acquire such facility in deliberating readily about the opposite in a practically imperceptible amount of time; and that deliberation, proceeding from the habit, would be sufficient for the resulting act to count as a sin, just as the analogous deliberation on the part of a good person would be sufficient for the resulting act to count as meritorious.

For this reason I do not distinguish, for purposes of whether something counts as a mortal sin, between the rarity or frequency of the perjury, but between deliberation and the lack of deliberation, such that when deliberation accompanies the perjury it is a mortal sin (whether it is a single act of perjury or habitual perjury), and lack of deliberation excuses (whether once or any number of times).

b. The second point of contention

Regarding the second point of contention, I say that the one to whom the oath is made understands the oath (on the basis of either positive law or common custom) as an unqualified assertion of what is sworn or else not as an unqualified assertion but as a persuasive consideration in favor of what is sworn.

In the first case I say that someone who swears to something that is in any way doubtful (that is, something that is not unqualifiedly certain and true), and does so deliberately, sins mortally, because he brings in God as a witness to confirm what he asserts is unqualifiedly certain and true, when it is not in fact unqualifiedly certain.

And this is how we should understand any sworn testimony in a case in which the kind of sentence that is customarily given should not be given unless the testimony is asserted as unqualifiedly certain. For example, a sentence of death should not be given except for a crime that is certain, so someone who swears that this defendant is guilty when he is not certain—however probable his conjecture that the defendant is guilty may be—and swears it in this sort of forum, where it follows from either positive law or custom that the defendant will be condemned to death, sins mortally. Very similar considerations apply to any forum in which someone who is convicted on the basis of sworn testimony will as a result be condemned as unqualifiedly guilty or as infamous in the eyes of the law: for in such a situation not only is irreverence done to the name of God, contrary to a commandment of the first table, but also the testimony is a destructive lie, because it harms one’s neighbour.

And if you say, “It is useful to the commonwealth—otherwise the wicked would grow too numerous,” God replies, “Carry out justly what is just” [Deut. 16:20]. For there are certain evils that are not to be punished by human beings but should be left to divine vengeance: namely, all those in which a human being as such cannot sufficiently reveal the truth in the way that it needs to be revealed in order for a punitive sentence to be justly imposed. And in these cases it is not only the witnesses who are culpable. So is the judge: if he knows that witnesses make a practice of testifying to things they merely believe, then he ought not impose the sort of sentence that it would be right to impose if guilt were proved unqualifiedly in his presence; for given this practice he knows that guilt has not been proved in his presence in a way sufficient to justify imposing such a punishment.

If, by contrast, it is established by positive law or custom that one who swears is held to the standard not of certainty but of belief, because what is sworn is taken as something believed, not as something unqualifiedly certain, then the oath-taker does not sin when he infers on the basis of persuasive indications that one alternative is likelier than the other. This is the view taken in the Decretals, “On scrutiny in ordination,” the single chapter: the response is given that “as far as human frailty permits one to know, he both knows and testifies that the ordinand is worthy of the burden of this office,” to which the lord Pope replies, “we do not believe that anyone sins in giving such a response, so long as he is not speaking contrary to his own conscience, because he is not asserting unqualifiedly that the ordinand is worthy, but that as far as human frailty permits one to know, he ought to regard the ordinand (whom he does not know to be unworthy) to be worthy.”

So in such promotions, whether to positions of dignity attained through election or ordination, or even in other organizations (for example: in universities, promotions to a professorship [magisterium]; in a religious order, to prelacy; or to other such acts), if it is an accepted custom that the declarations of respondents—given under oath, offered with solemn assurance, or made in fulfillment of a promise—should not be understood to indicate anything more than belief “as far as human frailty permits one to know,” and that the presiding officer does not know of any unworthiness in the candidate, then all their responses ought to be understood in accordance with that general custom, and the respondents do not sin in any way. (Granted, it would be safer in such cases to speak with some qualification, as in the passage quoted earlier from the Decretals: not unqualifiedly, but “as far as human frailty permits.”)

So in these cases “good-will is extended and hatred is kept in bounds,” as the juridical maxim has it. For in hateful things it is right for sworn testimony to state the truth—the certain truth—strictly, since otherwise the sentence of condemnation that will be given afterward will not be rightly given on the basis of such testimony. In matters of good-will it is sufficient for the sworn testimony to state what one believes to be true, especially in cases where there is a custom or positive law in the organization of saying what one believes, because on the basis of the truth to which testimony has been given on such terms the presiding officer can promote the candidate to such-and-such a rank.

But in every case, whether it concerns matters of good-will or hateful things, someone who swears to one thing when he actually believes that the opposite is more likely to be true, as well as someone who swears to something about which he is unqualifiedly in doubt and in his heart does not assent to one alternative any more than he does to the other, sins mortally in so swearing, because he brings God in as a witness to something he ought to be certain about but is not in fact certain about in either way.

3. An objection

Someone might object to the claim that perjury is against a commandment of the second table on the grounds that the Master evidently holds that perjury is a kind of lie and thus contrary to a precept of the second table, “You shall not utter false testimony against your neighbor” [Exodus 20:16]. One can reply that in perjury there is a twofold sin: a lie, as the material element of the sin, and the taking of God’s name in vain—that is, not merely for no useful purpose, but irreverently and contrary to reverence. The first pertains to the second table but the second pertains formally to the first table, because that is where irreverence is forbidden.

There can also be perjury without a lie. For example, suppose someone who is unqualifiedly uncertain swears to the alternative about which he has doubts; perhaps he would not be lying in making the assertion, because he does not have the opposite in mind. Or at any rate, in a case in which the oath-taker is bound to be certain, he commits perjury if he is not certain; and yet if he were to assert it without swearing, believing it more than its opposite, he would not be lying.

So it is perilous to have an oath frequently on one’s lips, because in many utterances without an oath one would not sin, where if one added an oath one would indeed sin—and sin seriously, if it were done deliberately. For this reason the Savior’s counsel in Matthew 5:37 is valuable: “Let your yes be yes and your no, no.”

C. The different kinds of oath, and in what way particular kinds of oath are sins

Concerning the third topic I say that a human statement is either about past or present things, whose truth is determinate, or about future things, whose truth is uncertain and indeterminate. A statement about the past or present is called “assertoric” (extending the notion of assertion to include both affirmation and negation), whereas a statement about the future, when it is within the power of the oath-taker, is called “promissory.”

Accordingly, since an oath can be an assertion of either kind of statement, there are two kinds of oath: assertoric and promissory. Both establish an obligation. An assertoric oath does so in that the oath-taker is obligated to tell the truth because he brings in such a witness to his assertion. A promissory oath does so in that the oath-taker is obligated to bring it about that what he says is true. And because an assertoric oath obligates only at the time at which it is made, and a promissory oath is said to be an obligation insofar as it has to do with the future, it is by appropriation that a promissory oath is called obligatory, because it obligates one to carry out in the future what one has sworn to do.

These two species of oath are comparable to the two species of obligations in sophisms, positio and petitio: positio obligates the respondent to uphold as true what is posited, petitio to carry out in deed what is asked for.

But here there is a point of contention. In a promissory oath, is the character of the oath presupposed, and, that having been weighed, a suitable witness is brought in to confirm what is said, or is it instead the veracity of the witness that is presupposed, so that the character of the utterance is considered secondarily, subordinate to the testimony of the witness? If the first were true, it would evidently be enough for the oath-taker to have the intention at the time he swears to carry out what he swears to do in the future, even if he changes his mind later. The second is evidently more consonant with the common view, because it is said that in the case of a promissory oath someone remains obligated until he fulfills his oath.

There is no need for any further discussion of assertoric perjury in particular, beyond what has already been covered under the heading of perjury in general.

But as for promissory or obligatory perjury, I say that such perjury can be reluctant or reckless or coerced, or free of all these inappropriate conditions.

Reluctant perjury is when the oath-taker swears he is going to do something, but even in that very act of swearing intends the opposite and does not intend to obligate himself to what he swears to do. Such a person sins mortally in that act of swearing, because he brings God in as a witness that he is resolved to carry out his oath, when in fact he intends the opposite. Nonetheless, after the oath he does not remain obligated, because in private obligations someone who does not intend to obligate himself is not obligated. Nor does it follow that he gains an advantage from his sin, just because he would be obligated if he had not sworn reluctantly. For there is no advantage in gaining a mortal sin, and if he had not sworn reluctantly, he would not have sinned mortally. Nonetheless, someone who does not swear reluctantly would be bound by his oath, whereas someone who does swear reluctantly is not: and this state of being bound is not as damaging as the damage that someone incurs through that reluctant oath, because in that latter act he sinned mortally.

An oath can be called reckless in two ways. The first is that it concerns matter that is altogether illicit: for example, someone swears that he will do something contrary to a commandment, such as swearing that he will kill someone or commit adultery with someone. Such an oath does not obligate the oath-taker to fulfill it, in such a way that after the oath he ought to carry out the act. Nonetheless, when he swore the oath, if he did not have such an intention, he sinned mortally, because he brought God in as a witness to something false; and if he did have such an intention, he sinned mortally, because willing to sin mortally is sinning mortally. In either case, therefore, he sins mortally in such an act of swearing. But afterward he ought not fulfill his oath, because he ought not add sin to sin. For it is not the case that because he swore something illicitly, something that was illicit becomes licit for him: a mortal sin does not make his condition freer.

The second kind of reckless oath concerns matter that is licit in and of itself, but not licit for the oath-taker: for example, suppose someone abjures works of perfection and thereby resists the movement of the Holy Spirit. Keeping such an oath would lead to a worse outcome, and therefore afterward one ought not keep the oath. For although it is licit, in an absolute sense, not to do works of perfection, it is not licit to have a settled will never to do works of perfection, since that would be to have a settled will contrary to the movement of the Holy Spirit.

So in the case of these two oaths, the reluctant and the reckless (in both ways discussed above), it is clear that someone does not remain obligated after his oath to carry out what he swears; rather, in that very act of swearing someone sins mortally.

One could identify another kind of reckless oath: when someone swears he will do something that he cannot in fact do. If, when he swears, he thinks that he can do it, one should evaluate this case in keeping with what was said in the section on oaths in general: if he can carry it out in the future, he is bound to do so; but if he can’t, yet when he made his oath he believed he could, he is excused in matters of good-will.

As for coerced oaths, where the coercion is such as to affect a man of steady character, there are various views. See my discussion in Book IV [d. 29 q. un].

A promissory oath in which none of these three conditions (reluctance, recklessness, and coercion) is present establishes an obligation for the oath-taker never to have a will opposed to what he swore, though if he postpones fulfilling the oath on account of circumstances that make postponement seem appropriate, he does not sin. Rather, he first becomes a perjurer when he has a will not to fulfill what he has sworn, because it is at that point that he first wills God to have been a witness to something false.

II. Replies to the initial arguments

The reply to the first argument is obvious: “If you have made an immoral vow, change your decision.” Yet in making that [initial] decision one sins mortally.

To the second argument I say that, other things being equal, the greatest oath is to swear by God, since it is not licit to swear by anything else unless God is in that thing in some distinctive way (for example, “by the Gospel,” because God is distinctively revealed in it; “by heaven,” because God dwells there in a distinctive way; “by the Church,” because God is worshiped there in a distinctive way). Yet the custom that demands that some oaths be made with greater solemnity than others is a reasonable one, and it is presumed that things done with solemnity are never done without deliberation. Therefore, the Church has caused people to be afraid to swear by such things unless they do so solemnly, and consequently with deliberation and when the truth is to be asserted without qualification.

By contrast, people swear by God commonly and flippantly, and frequently without deliberation.

I say then that swearing by God is the most serious, but if someone does so indeliberately, as compared to someone who swears on the Gospel, there can be mortal sin in the latter case but not in the former—not because of the sacredness of that by which someone swears, but because there is deliberation in the latter case but not in the former.

You might object, “Why then is someone who commits perjury against the Gospels infamous, but someone who commits perjury against God is not?” I reply: infamy does not always follow from the seriousness of the fault, but from the public character of the crime. Now the law requires that one take one’s oath on the Gospels deliberately and publicly, and so someone who transgresses such an oath is presumed to be a violator of the faith, and thus it is reasonable for him to be held in infamy. Such a presumption cannot be made in the case of someone who flippantly commits perjury against God.

In reply to the last argument, it is clear that a promissory oath obliges, and that it does not oblige one to carry out the act one has sworn to perform.